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Abstract
We investigate properties of monadic purely negational fragment
of Intuitionistic Control Logic (ICL). This logic arises from Intuition-
istic Propositional Logic (IPL) by extending language of IPL by addi-
tional new constant for falsum. Having two different falsum constants
enables to define two forms of negation. We analyse implicational
relations between negational monadic formulae and present a poset
of non equivalent formulae of this fragment of ICL.
MSC (2010) Primary: 03B60, 03B20, 03B70; Secondary: 03B62,
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1 Introduction
Intuitionistic Control Logic (ICL) was defined semantically and proof theo-
retically by Chuck Liang and Dale Miller in their joint work [1]. This logic
can be seen as a combination of classical and intuitionistic logics. The origi-
nal impetus for ICL came from the search for a logic that would preserve the
crucial connective of intuitionistic implication and at the same time would
be able to type programming language control operators such as call/cc. ICL
adds to the language of IPL a new constant ⊥ which is distinct from intu-
itionistic falsum 0. Having these two falsum constants 0 and ⊥ enables to
define two forms of negation: ∼A = A→ 0 and ¬A = A→⊥ respectively.
Let us compare negations in classical and intuitionistic logics. We de-
note intuitionistic negation by ∼A and classical by ¬A. It corresponds
with notation in ICL and intuitive meaning of ¬A as ”classical” negation in
this logic. In Classical Propositional Logic (CPL) there exist only two non
equivalent negational formulae: A,¬A. The classical negation is involutive
i.e. ¬¬A ↔ A is a CPL tautology, so it is not possible to define a new op-
erator by iterating classical negation. In IPL there are three non equivalent
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negational formulae: A,∼A,∼∼A. It is known that ∼∼A does not imply
A in intuitionistic logic, but ∼∼∼A ↔ ∼A is an intuitionistic tautology.
Thus using intuitionistic implication we can obtain a new operation which
is a double negation ∼∼. Further multiplying of intuitionistic negations
will only give us (up to equivalence) a formula ∼A in case of odd number
of negations or a formula∼∼A if there is even number of negations to start
with.
In Intuitionistic Control Logic there are two distinct negations: ∼A
which is an ordinary intuitionistic negation and¬A which bears some char-
acteristics of classical negation. Combination of these two kinds of nega-
tion results in possibility of forming new operators. We extract them and
present their relations with respect to intuitionistic implication.
2 Preliminaries
In this section we recall some facts about ICL from [1]. We consider only
propositional logic. Language of ICL consists of countably many variables
denoted p1, p2, p3, . . ., intuitionistic connectives ∨,∧,→ called respectively
disjunction, conjunction and implication and of three constants 0, 1,⊥. As
a shorthand for (A → B) ∧ (B → A) we use the expression A ↔ B.
A Kripke model for ICL will be called an r-model and is defined as follows.
Definition 1. AKripke r-model is a quadruple of the form 〈W, r ,≤,〉where
W is a finite, non-empty set,≤ is a reflexive and transitive relation on the set
W and  is a binary relation between elements of W and atomic formulae
called forcing. Elements of the set W are called worlds or nodes. The element
r ∈ W is the root of the model. It is the least element of the set W ( r ≤ u
for every world u ∈W).
The forcing relation  is monotone, that is if u ≤ v then u  p implies
v  p. The  relation is extended to all formulae in the following way. Let
u, v, i ∈W.
• u  1 and u 6 0
• r 6⊥
• i ⊥ for all i > r
• u  A ∨ B iff u  A or u  B
• u  A ∧ B iff u  A and u  B
• u  A→ B iff for all v ≥ u if v  A then v  B.
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If a formula is forced in every world of an r-model, we say that it is satisfied
in this r-model. If a formula A is satisfied in all r-models we say that it is
valid, in symbols |= A.
Constants 0 and 1 corresponds to intuitionistic falsum and verum. A for-
mula of ICL that does not contain constant ⊥ is an intuitionistic formula.
Forcing of ⊥ distinguishes between the root of an r-model and the rest
of worlds. We will call every world properly above the root an imaginary
world. We use symbols u, v,w to represent arbitrary worlds in W and the
symbol i to represent an imaginary world.
Because of two different constants for falsum, it is possible to define
two different negations
Intuitionistic negation: ∼p = p→ 0
Classical negation: ¬ p = p→⊥
The term classical in the name of the second negation refers to the law of
excluded middle which, with respect to this negation, is an ICL tautology.
Let us suppose that p ∨ ¬p is refuted in the root of some r-model:
r 6 p ∨ ¬p.
This is equivalent to
r 6 p and r 6 ¬p
which implies that r 6 p and there exists a world u ≥ r such that u  p
and u 6⊥. Condition u 6⊥ means that u = r . Hence we get a contradic-
tion. Nevertheless this negation is not fully classical — it is not involutive
as ¬¬p does not imply p. It is because this negation is defined using intu-
itionistic implication. For this reason we prefer to call it ⊥-negation, instead
of ”classical” negation.
In [1] Liang and Miller defined sequent calculus LJC for Intuitionistic
Control Logic and proved soundness and completeness of LJC with respect
to the Kripke semantics. However, in this paper we focus on the semanti-
cal approach and the equivalence between provability of a formula and its
validity in all r-models is alluded to only in Theorem 4. The symbol ` A
denotes provability of a formula A in LJC.
For a background in intuitionistic logic see [2].
3 Negational fragment
In this paper we will consider monadic purely negational fragment of ICL,
i.e. the fragment in the language of ∼, ¬ and p only. It means that we treat
both negations as primitive connectives, not defined by means of constants
and implication. Formulae of this fragment will be called n-formulae.
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It will be understood that Nk and Nm are different sequences of both
negations and that k,m ∈ {0, 1, 2, . . .} = N. To discriminate sequences of
the same length we will use superscripts N1k , N
2
k etc. By ∼n and ¬n we will
understand iteration of n negations of given kind. We will denote by Nkp
an n-formula with k negations of both kinds. By the length of an n-formula
Nkp we define the number k of negations. Formulae of the form N2jp and
N2j+1p will be called even n-formula and odd n-formula, respectively. We will
treat the variable p as a negational formula of the length 0.
Every r-model defined as in Definition 1 is a model for monadic purely
negational fragment of ICL as well. However, since negations ∼ and ¬ are
our primitive notions, considering r-models for negational fragment we
should define interpretation of these connectives independently.
Definition 2. A Kripke model for the negational fragment of ICL is a tu-
ple M = 〈W, r ,≤,〉 where W, r and ≤ are defined as in Definition 1
and the forcing relation  is restricted to the variable p and constants 0, ⊥.
Additionally we define the interpretation of negations:
• u  ∼A iff w 6 A, for allw ≥ u
• u  ¬A iff w 6 A or w > r , for allw ≥ u.
It is according to the definition of forcing for constants 0,⊥ and intu-
itionistic implication in the case of full language. Forcing of intuitionistic
negation is standard. For ⊥-negation we have
u  ¬p iff w 6 p or w ⊥, for allw ≥ u.
The condition w ⊥means that w is an imaginary world.
Fact 3. For every n-formula A we have:
1. r  ¬A iff r 6 A,
2. r 6 ¬A iff r  A,
3. u 6 ¬A iff u = r and u  A for arbitrary u ∈W,
4. i  ¬A for all i > r .
The first point is straightforward from definition. In ICL the distinction
between the root of the r-model and other worlds is expressed by the forc-
ing of⊥, whereas in the monadic purely negational fragment the root of the
model is the only world in which ⊥-negation of a formula can be refuted:
u 6 ¬A iff w  A and w = r , for somew ≥ u.
It follows that⊥-negation of a formula is forced in every imaginary world.
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We are interested in relations between n-formulae and we investigate
validity of formulae of the form Nkp→ Nmp. We denote byN the set of all
n-formulae. In the standard way we define an equivalence relation ≡ on
the set N :
A ≡ B iff |= A→ B and |= B→ A.
As usual, we consider the quotient set:
N/≡ = {[A]≡ | A ∈ N},
where [A]≡ is the equivalence class of a formula A. The relation onN/≡
is given by:
[A]≡  [B]≡ iff |= A→ B.
Although the relation  is defined on equivalence classes, no confusion
should arise if we use it to denote a relation between two n-formulae:
A  B iff |= A→ B.
If for an n-formula A = Nkp exists an n-formula B = Nmp such that A ≡ B
and m < k, we say that A is reducible to B. In the other case we say that an
n-formula A is irreducible.
Most proofs of facts about implicational relations between n-formulae
are reduced to showing a contradiction in the procedure of finding a coun-
termodel for a formula A → B. For n-formulae of a length greater that 4
we repeatedly refer to extensionality.
Theorem 4. For any formula A( p¯, s) and for all formulae B,C if ` B↔ C then
` A( p¯, B/s)↔ A( p¯,C/s).
It is well-known that this theorem holds for IPL. The proof is by in-
duction on the complexity of formulae. However, the case of additional
constant ⊥ does not interfere with the proof, thus the theorem holds for
ICL as well.
4 Relations between models
In a Kripke model for either ICL or its negational fragment let ◦mark a node
in which a variable p is refuted and • a node in which p is forced.
Firstly, let us consider two basic n-formulae ∼p and ¬p. It is easy to see
that minimal model and countermodel for ∼p are ◦ and • respectively. In
case of ¬p due to Fact 3 we have r  ¬p iff r 6 p and r 6 ¬p iff r  p.
Thus a minimal model for ¬p is ◦ and minimal countermodel is •.
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The fact that ∼p and ¬p have the same minimal models and counter-
models does not imply that these formulae are equivalent. There is a model
in which ¬p is satisfied and ∼p is refuted, namely:
• i
◦ r
It is easy to see, that for every n-formula Nkp the minimal model or
countermodel are ◦ and •. These cases may seem not very interesting as
they collapse both negations to the situation of ordinary classical negation.
However, looking for a countermodel for an intuitionistic implication of
two formulae is equivalent to looking for a model for the antecedent and
a countermodel for the consequent. While considering an implication of
n-formulae, one of these cases are frequently reduced to either ◦ or •, so
it is sufficient to know if the variable can be forced or refuted in a given
world of the model. This depends on the evenness of the sequence of nega-
tions preceding the variable. The following fact becomes useful in such
situations.
Proposition 5. For every world u in an r-modelM we have:
1. if u  N2kp then w  p or w > r , for some w ≥ u,
2. if u  N2k+1p then w 6 p or w > r , for some w ≥ u,
3. if u 6 N2kp then w 6 p or w > r , for some w ≥ u,
4. if u 6 N2k+1p then w  p or w > r , for some w ≥ u.
Proof. We prove only one of the two most complex cases which is 2, others
can be proven in an analogous way.
LetM be an r-model and u an arbitrary world in this model. The proof
is by induction on k.
Let k = 0 and let A = N1p. We have to consider two cases:
Case 1. A = ∼p.
Assume that u  ∼p. Then for all w ≥ u we have w 6 p and the claim
trivially follows.
Case 2. A = ¬p.
From the assumption that u  ¬p it follows that either u = r and u 6 p or
u > r . In both cases the claim follows.
For the induction step, let k > 0 and let A = N2(k+1)+1p. Now, we
consider following cases:
Case 1. A = ∼∼N2k+1p.
Assume that
u  ∼∼N2k+1p.
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Then for every v ≥ u there exists a world v′ ≥ v such that v′  N2k+1p.
Hence, by the induction hypothesis, there is w ≥ v′ with
w 6 p or w > r .
In particular it follows that the claim holds.
Case 2. A = ∼¬N2k+1p.
From the assumption
u  ∼¬N2k+1p
we get that for every world u′ ≥ u we have u′ 6 ¬N2k+1p. From point 3 of
Fact 3 it follows that r is the only world of the model and
r  N2k+1p,
which, by the induction hypothesis, obviously implies the claim.
Case 3. A = ¬∼N2k+1p.
Then from
u  ¬∼N2k+1p
it follows that, in particular,
u 6 ∼N2k+1p or u > r .
If the latter holds, we are done. The former implies that there is u′ ≥ u with
u′  N2k+1p
and the claim follows from the induction hypothesis.
Case 4. A = ¬¬N2k+1p.
Assume that
u  ¬¬N2k+1p.
Then it follows that either u > r , in which case the claim holds, or u = r
and u 6 ¬N2k+1p. If so, from Fact 3 we have r  N2k+1p and again, by
the induction hypothesis, we get the claim.
Let us consider an implication of two different n-formulae Nkp→ Nmp.
Such a formula is never valid if the evenness of k and m is not the same.
Indeed, suppose that
r 6 Nkp→ Nmp
and let k = 2j1,m = 2j2 + 1 for some j1, j2 ∈ N. Then there exists a world
u ≥ r such that
u  N2j1 p and u 6 N2j2+1p.
The countermodel for such a formula is •. The other case of evenness is
symmetrical with a countermodel ◦.
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In fact for an implication of two different n-formulae we never need
a countermodel of height greater than 2. That is because the implication
which bounds two n-formulae is the only connective that in building a coun-
termodel requires creating a new world possibly above the root. The search
for a countermodel for a formula
A = Nkp→ Nmp
always starts with the assumption that r 6 A which is equivalent to the fact
that there is a world u ≥ r such that
u  Nkp and u 6 Nmp.
The minimal countermodel for an n-formula is either ◦ or •. Intuitionis-
tic negation influences only the forcing of a subformula at the given world,
regardless what kind of the world it is. Considering the ⊥-negation of
a formula requires discriminating the root from imaginary worlds. In other
worlds, forcing of the variable in a given world is one of the two ways of
distinguishing worlds in a model. The other one, as was already said, is
refuting the ⊥-negation of a formula.
Example 6. Let A = ¬¬∼p and B = ¬∼∼p. We will show that A  B and
B 6 A.
Suppose that there exists an r-model in which A→ B is not satisfied i.e.
this formula is refuted in some world of this model. Showing a contradic-
tion will give us A  B.
Refutation of a formula in some world of an r-model means that it can-
not be forced in the root of the model: r 6 A → B, so there exists a world
u possibly above the root, such that u  ¬¬∼p and u 6 ¬∼∼p. The first
condition says that either the world u is imaginary or u = r and the vari-
able p is not forced in any node of the model. The latter condition implies
that u = r and for every world w in the model exists w′ ≥ w with w′  p,
hence a contradiction. It follows that A  B.
Suppose that for some r-model r 6 B → A. Then again there exists
a world u possibly above the root in which u  ¬∼∼p and u 6 ¬¬∼p. Re-
futing the formula ¬¬∼p in some world of a model means that this world
is the root and there must exists a node somewhere in the model in which
p is forced. If so, forcing of the formula ¬∼∼p implies that there exists
a world w ≥ r for which w′ 6 p for every w′ ≥ w, so in particular r 6 p.
The least possible countermodel is:
◦ •
◦
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The first part of the example shows that in looking for a countermodel
the kind of a current world (either the root or imaginary) is important.
The second part shows the difference of forcing of the variable in imagi-
nary worlds. No bigger models would be necessary, as there is only one
variable to validate and only one intuitionistic implication.
In other worlds forcing or refuting an intuitionistic negation of a for-
mula in a world possibly above the root cannot extort creating a new world
properly above. Forcing of⊥-negation of a formula in the root depends on
the forcing of the variable, above the root it is always forced. The case of
refuted ⊥-negation of a formula sends us back to the root.
For a monadic negational formula there are two possible countermodels
of the height of 1 and four possible countermodels of the height of 2:
◦ •
◦
◦
•
◦
•
•
◦ •
◦
0 1 02 2 12 3
Let us denote the set {0, 1, 02, 2, 12, 3} of these models by S .
We are interested in finding the upper bound of the number of non
equivalent n-formulae. We are looking for n-formulae A and B such that
A 6 B. It means that there exists a model for the formula A in which we
can refute the other n-formula. To every implication A → B we can assign
a subset of S of models in which this formula is refuted. Such subset cannot
contain both of the models ◦ and •, because contradiction is not expressible
in our language. There are 25 such subsets of S , so there are at most 32 non
equivalent monadic n-formulae.
For a given n-formula every model from the set S can be either a model
or a countermodel. The existence of only six possible models for monadic
n-formulae enables to characterize these formulae in terms of their models.
Let ’+’ stand for ’valid’, and ’-’ for ’not valid’. For example for the formula
p we have
N0 0 1 02 2 12 3
p - + - - + -
and for n-formulae of the length 2 we have
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N2 0 1 02 2 12 3
∼∼p - + - + + -
∼¬p - + - - - -
¬∼p - + - + + +
¬¬p - + - - + -
It can be seen that there are two countermodels for a formula∼∼p→ ∼¬p,
namely 2 and 12. However, we could also see that sets of models for p
and ¬¬p are the same, and it is known, that ⊥-negation is not involutive.
Obviously some informations are missing.
In the case of IPL, when we look for a countermodel of a formula A →
B, we can always start with the assumption that it is already falsified in
the root of the model, i.e. we can assume that r  A and r 6 B. That is
because in IPL the root of the model is no different from other worlds. We
already saw that in ICL there is a considerate difference between the root
and any imaginary world, e.g. the root is the only world of the model in
which ¬A can be refuted. It is not enough to look for countermodels of
an n-formula starting in the root of an r-model. The forcing of it has to be
also revised in those possible imaginary worlds of models 02, 2, 12 and 3.
It is not sufficient to examine sets of models and countermodels for each
n-formula. Its validity has to be also verified in every pseudosubmodel. Here
by the pseudosubmodel we mean any generated submodel in the sense of
IPL which is not an r-model, that is which consists imaginary worlds only.
Let us denote i(0), i(1) and i(0, 1) pseudosubmodels of 02, 12, 3 respectively.
The pseudosubmodel of 2 is the same as that of 12.
For p and ¬¬p we have
i(0) i(1) i(0, 1)
p - + +
¬¬p + + +
Indeed, assume that
r 6 ¬¬p→ p.
Then in some world u ≥ r we have u  ¬¬p and u 6 p. Forcing of a dou-
ble ⊥-negation of the variable in a world possibly above the root implies
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that
either u > r or u = r and u  p,
hence the countermodel for a formula ¬¬p→ p is 02.
5 Semantic characterisation of n-formulae
It was already emphasised that no n-formula with odd number of nega-
tions can be equivalent to n-formula with even number of negations. There-
fore all properties concerning equivalences between n-formulae are divided
into two cases: for odd and even length of n-formulae. The property of re-
duction of negations with respect to sequences of one type of negation is
straightforward and it follows from the fact that both ∼∼∼p ≡ ∼p and
¬¬¬p ≡ ¬p.
Proposition 7. For any k ∈N we have:
1. ∼(2k+2)p ≡ ∼∼p,
2. ∼(2k+1)p ≡ ∼p,
3. ¬(2k+2)p ≡ ¬¬p,
4. ¬(2k+1)p ≡ ¬p.
Proof. Ad 1 and 2
Equivalence between ∼p and ∼∼∼p is an intuitionistic tautology. From
this and extensionality we get the thesis.
Ad 3 and 4
Let us see that ¬¬¬p ≡ ¬p. Suppose that 6|= ¬¬¬p → ¬p, so there exists
an r-model in which r 6 ¬¬¬p → ¬p. Then there exists a world u ≥ r
such that
u  ¬¬¬p and u 6 ¬p.
According to point 3 of Fact 3, refuting the⊥-negation of a formula in some
world of a model sends us back to the root, so the latter condition implies
that u = r and u  p. If so, from the former condition and point 1 of Fact 3
it follows that in the root the formula ¬¬p is refuted. A contradiction, since
this means that r 6 p.
Suppose that the formula ¬p → ¬¬¬p is not valid. Then in the root of
some r-model we have r 6 ¬p → ¬¬¬p. Hence for a world u possibly
above the root we have
u  ¬p and u 6 ¬¬¬p.
Similar argumentation as in previous case with respect to the second con-
dition shows that u = r and u  ¬¬p. From points 1 and 2 of Fact 3 we
11
have that r  p. On the other hand, since u = r , from u  ¬p follows
r 6 p, a contradiction. Therefore ¬¬¬p ≡ ¬p and the claim follows from
extensionality.
In [1] Liang and Miller distinguished a formula ∼¬A → A. It enables
to emulate the C control operator. From point 1 of the following proposi-
tion it follows that the formula ∼¬p is a representative of a wide class of
equivalent n-formulae of the form ∼¬N2kp. Point 2 shows a similar result
for a class of odd n-formulae.
Proposition 8. For any k ∈N we have:
1. ∼¬N2kp ≡ ∼¬p,
2. ∼¬N2k+1p ≡ ∼¬¬p.
Proof. Ad 1
Assume there exists an r-modelM in which r 6 ∼¬N2kp → ∼¬p. Thus
there exists a world u ≥ r for which we have
u  ∼¬N2kp and u 6 ∼¬p,
that is in all worlds above the world u the formula ¬N2kp is refuted, which
means that the possible countermodel consists of the root only and that
r  N2kp. Thus from point 1 of Proposition 5 we have r  p. On the other
hand, refuting the formula∼¬p in the root in particular implies that r 6 p.
A contradiction.
Let r be the root of some r-model in which a formula ∼¬p → ∼¬N2kp
is not satisfied. Then for some world u ≥ r we claim that
u  ∼¬p and u 6 ∼¬N2kp.
As could be already seen in the case of reverse implication, forcing of the for-
mula ∼¬p in arbitrary world implies that the model is reduced to the root
and r  p. From point 3 of Proposition 5 with respect to the second con-
dition and the fact that the model comprises the root only, it yields that
r 6 p. From which we get a contradiction and as a result the claim follows.
Ad 2
Suppose that 6|= ∼¬N2k+1p → ∼¬¬p. So there exists an r-model such that
for the root of it we have
r 6 ∼¬N2k+1p→ ∼¬¬p
which implies that there exists a world u ≥ r such that
u  ∼¬N2k+1p and u 6 ∼¬¬p.
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Similar argumentation as in the proof of point 1 and application of point 2
of Proposition 5 to the first condition implies that for all worlds u′ ≥ u we
have
u′ = r and u′ 6 p.
If the root is the only world of the model, then in particular u 6 ∼¬¬p
implies u = r  p, a contradiction.
Let us consider an r-model in which ∼¬¬p → ∼¬N2k+1p is not satis-
fied. Then this formula is refuted in the root of this model and there exists
a world u ≥ r such that
u  ∼¬¬p and u 6 ∼¬N2k+1p.
The first condition implies that in every world u′ ≥ u the formula ¬¬p is
refuted and that means
u′ = r and u′ 6 p,
whereas from the second condition follows that there is a world v ≥ u such
that v  ¬N2k+1p. If so, by application of the point 4 of Proposition 5 and
the fact of the root being the only world of the model, we have in particular
v′ = r and v′  p,
a contradiction. Thus the thesis holds.
Proposition 7 and Proposition 8 show that in many cases we can reduce
an n-formula of a greater length to a formula of length less than 4.
In fact the formula ∼¬p implies every n-formula with even number of
negations. That is because forcing of the formula ∼¬A at a given world
sends us back to the root of the model in which A must be forced. Thus
we get a minimal element with respect to relation  for the subset of even
n-formulae. Analogically the formula ∼¬¬p is the minimal element for
the subset of odd n-formulae. These two facts are corollaries from points 1
and 2 of Proposition 8 and the following proposition:
Proposition 9. For every k,m ∈N following implications hold:
1. ∼¬N2kp→ N2mp,
2. ∼¬N2k+1p→ N2m+1p.
Proof. Ad 1
Assume r 6 ∼¬N2kp → N2mp for the root of some r-modelM. Then in
some world u ≥ r we have u  ∼¬N2kp and u 6 N2mp. From the former
it follows that the root is the only world of the modelM and r 6 ¬N2kp.
According to point 2 of Fact 3 it follows that r  N2kp. On the other hand
r 6 N2mp, a contradiction.
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Ad 2
Let M be an r-model in which r 6 ∼¬N2k+1p → N2m+1p. Then there
exists a world u ≥ r such that u  ∼¬N2k+1p and u 6 N2m+1p. Hence,
due to a similar reasoning as in point 1, since the root is the only world of
the model we have r  N2k+1p and r 6 N2m+1p, a contradiction.
It is worth noting that n-formulae ∼∼¬¬p and ∼∼¬p are maximal el-
ements with respect to the relation  for subsets of even n-formulae and
odd n-formulae, respectively.
Proposition 10. For any k ∈N following implications are valid:
1. N2kp→ ∼∼¬¬p,
2. N2k+1p→ ∼∼¬p.
Proof. Ad 1
Let M be an r-model in which r 6 N2kp → ∼∼¬¬p. Then there exist
a world u possibly above the root such that u  N2kp and u 6 ∼∼¬¬p.
The latter implies that the modelM consists of only one element, namely
the root and r 6 p. If there is no worlds properly above the root, then from
u  N2kp, according to point 1 of Proposition 5 it follows in particular that
r  p, a contradiction.
Ad 2
Suppose that there exists an r-modelM in which r 6 N2k+1p → ∼∼¬p.
Then there exists a world u ≥ r such that u  N2k+1p and u 6 ∼∼¬p.
According to point 2 of Proposition 5 it follows that there exists a world
w ≥ u such that w 6 p or w > r . On the other hand, refuting the formula
∼∼¬p in an arbitrary world of the model means that there are no worlds
properly above the root and r  p. We have a contradiction and hence
the claim holds.
For every k ∈ N there are 2k n-formulae Nkp. It was already said
that there are at most 32 non equivalent n-formulae. Procedure of find-
ing these n-formulae is reduced to checking if the relation Nkp  Nmp
holds. It would be arduous if it weren’t for the fact that we can characterize
a negational formula in terms of its models and countermodels. Instead of
checking satisfiability of formulae of the form Nkp → Nmp for subsequent
n-formulae Nkp, Nmp, it is sufficient to compare sets of models and coun-
termodels, including pseudosubmodels, for these n-formulae. For a given
n-formula Nkp let S+(Nkp) be the subset of S ∪ {i(0), i(1), i(0, 1)} of mod-
els in which n-formula Nkp is valid. The relation Nkp  Nmp between two
n-formulae holds if and only if S+(Nkp) ⊆ S+(Nmp). Complete tables of
models for a given n-formula up to the length 5 are given in the Appendix.
Semantically all proofs of following facts are similar to the proof of
Proposition 7. They are not informative, thus omitted.
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As a representative for every equivalence class we choose a formula of
the smallest length. We start with three equivalence classes of the simplest
n-formulae, namely
[p]≡, [∼p]≡ and [¬p]≡
and we will shortly discuss subsequent n-formulae.
Fact 11. All n-formulae of length 2 are pairwise non equivalent.
As none of n-formulae N2p is reducible, we can distinguish four differ-
ent equivalence classes:
[∼∼p]≡, [∼¬p]≡, [¬∼p]≡, [¬¬p]≡.
There are 8 n-formulae N3p. From Proposition 7 if follows that ∼∼∼p and
¬¬¬p are reducible to ∼p and ¬p respectively.
Fact 12. There are only two irreducible formulae N3p that are not equivalent to
any other n-formulae of the length 3, namely ¬∼∼p and ¬¬∼p.
Fact 13. For n-formulae of the length 3 we have following equivalences:
1. ∼∼¬p ≡ ¬∼¬p,
2. ∼¬∼p ≡ ∼¬¬p.
From Proposition 7.2, Proposition 7.4, Fact 12 and Fact 13 it follows that
there are only 4 irreducible and not equivalent n-formulae N3p. We choose
following representatives:
[∼¬¬p]≡, [¬¬∼p]≡, [¬∼∼p]≡ and [∼∼¬p]≡.
Most of n-formulae N4p could be reduced to some n-formula N2p using
Proposition 7 and Proposition 8. Remaining n-formulae are divided into
three equivalence classes.
Fact 14. For n-formulae of the length 4 we have following equivalences:
1. ∼∼¬∼p ≡ ¬∼¬∼p ≡ ∼∼¬¬p ≡ ¬∼¬¬p,
2. ¬¬∼¬p ≡ ¬∼∼¬p.
Fact 15. There is only one irreducible n-formula of length 4 that is not equivalent
to any other n-formula N4p, namely ¬¬∼∼p.
Recapitulating, we can distinguish three representatives of irreducible
and not equivalent n-formulae of the length 4 which will denote equiva-
lence classes:
[¬∼∼¬p]≡, [¬¬∼∼p]≡ and [∼∼¬¬p]≡.
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Fact 16. There are only 4 irreducible n-formulae of the length 5. These formulae
are equivalent: ¬∼∼¬∼p ≡ ¬∼∼¬¬p ≡ ¬¬∼¬∼p ≡ ¬¬∼¬¬p.
The equivalence class of these n-formulae will be denoted by
[¬∼∼¬¬p]≡.
All remaining n-formulae N5p are reducible to some formulae N3p. Equiva-
lences between n-formulae N5p and N3p are based on Proposition 7, Propo-
sition 8 and extensionality. There is only one not obvious case namely
¬¬∼∼¬p ≡ ∼∼¬p. Indeed, let us suppose that 6|= ¬¬∼∼¬p → ∼∼¬p.
Then there exists some modelM in which r 6 ¬¬∼∼¬p → ∼∼¬p. That
is there exists some world u ≥ r such that u  ¬¬∼∼¬p and u 6 ∼∼¬p.
From the second condition follows that there exists a world v ≥ u such that
for every world w ≥ v we have w 6 p. This means that the world w is
the root of the modelM and the only world of it and r  p. On the other
hand we have r  ¬¬∼∼¬p which implies that r 6 p, a contradiction.
Let us suppose that 6|= ∼∼¬p → ¬¬∼∼¬p. Then again for the root of
some modelM we have r 6 ∼∼¬p → ¬¬∼∼¬p. Hence there is a world
u ≥ r such that u  ∼∼¬p and u 6 ¬¬∼∼¬p. The second part implies
that u = r and u 6 ∼∼¬p, a contradiction.
Corollary 17. Every n-formula N6p is reducible to some n-formula Nkp of length
k ≤ 4.
Proof. For every n-formula N6p there exists a sequence N5 such that either
N6p = ∼N5p or N6p = ¬N5p. We consider two cases.
Case 1. The formula N5p is reducible to some n-formula N3p. Then
we have either N6p ≡ ∼N3p or N6p ≡ ¬N3p, which implies that every
n-formula N6p is reducible to some n-formula N4p.
Case 2. The formula N5p is irreducible. Then from Fact 16 follows that
N5p ∈ [¬∼∼¬¬p]≡. If N6p = ∼N5p then in particular N6p ≡ ∼¬∼∼¬¬p
and from Proposition 8.1 follows that N6p ≡ ∼¬p. If N6p = ¬N5p then in
particular N6p ≡ ¬¬¬∼¬¬p. From point 4 of Proposition 7 it follows that
N6p ≡ ¬∼¬¬p.
Theorem 18. Every n-formula Nkp, for k ≥ 6 is reducible to some n-formula of
length m ≤ 5.
Proof. By induction on k. The induction base follows from Corollary 17.
Assume that k > 6. Let  ∈ {∼,¬}. Let Nk+1p = Nkp. From
the induction hypothesis there exists a sequence Nm such that m ≤ 5 and
Nkp ≡ Nmp. Thus we have Nk+1p ≡ Nmp. If m < 5, we get the thesis. Else
it is the case of the induction base.
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6 Equivalence classes of n-formulae
As a conclusion from the previous section, especially Facts 11– 16, Corol-
lary 17 and Theorem 18 we get the exact power of the set N/≡.
Theorem 19. There are exactly 15 (up to equivalence) pairwise not equivalent
and irreducible n-formulae:
p
∼∼p ∼p
∼¬p ¬p
¬∼p ∼∼¬p
¬¬p ∼¬¬p
∼∼¬¬p ¬∼∼p
¬∼∼¬p ¬¬∼p
¬¬∼∼p ¬∼∼¬¬p
Two following theorems gather all relations between elements of the set
N/≡. We present them in the form of implications of n-formulae for chosen
representatives of equivalence classes, as this is more readable. By stating
that an implication Nkp → Nmp is valid we mean that the reverse implica-
tion is not valid.
Theorem 20. Following implications of even n-formulae are valid:
1. ∼¬p→ p
2. p→ ¬¬p
3. ¬¬p→ ¬¬∼∼p
4. ¬¬∼∼p→ ¬∼p
5. ¬∼p→ ∼∼¬¬p
6. ∼¬p→ ¬∼∼¬p
7. ¬∼∼¬p→ ¬¬p
8. p→ ∼∼p
9. ∼∼p→ ¬¬∼∼p
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Theorem 21. Following implications of odd n-fomulae are valid:
1. ∼¬¬p→ ∼p
2. ∼p→ ¬¬∼p
3. ¬¬∼p→ ¬∼∼p
4. ¬∼∼p→ ¬p
5. ¬p→ ∼∼¬p
6. ∼¬¬p→ ¬∼∼¬¬p
7. ¬∼∼¬¬p→ ¬¬∼p
Proof. As a proof of both Theorem 20 and Theorem 21 we refer the Reader
to validity tables in the Appendix. Checking the validity of a formula
Nkp → Nmp (and stating that the reverse implication is not valid) is re-
duced to checking if S+(Nkp)  S+(Nmp).
Relations between classes of equivalent formulae are described by Lin-
denbaum Algebra. In the case of negational monadic fragment of ICL we
cannot create such a structure. So we present a poset (N ∗ ∪ {0,⊥, 1},),
where N ∗ is the set of chosen representatives of equivalence classes of
N/≡.
1
∼∼¬¬p ∼∼¬p
¬∼p ¬p
¬¬∼∼p ¬∼∼p
∼∼p ¬¬p ¬¬∼p
p ¬∼∼¬p ¬∼∼¬¬p ∼p
∼¬p ⊥ ∼¬¬p
0
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The addition of constants enables to join the two posets of equivalence
classes of even and odd n-formulae.
After looking into properties of negational formulae several questions
arose. They consider mainly computational content of n-formulae. Further
work would also include investigations of implicational fragment of ICL.
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Appendix
We give complete validity tables for n-formulae Nkp up to the length of 5.
0 1 02 2 12 3 i(0) i(1) i(0, 1)
p - + - - + - - + +
∼p + - + - - - + - -
¬p + - + + - + + + +
∼∼p - + - + + - - + -
∼¬p - + - - - - - - -
¬∼p - + - + + + + + +
¬¬p - + - - + - + + +
∼∼∼p + - + - - - + - -
∼∼¬p + - + + + + + + +
∼¬∼p + - - - - - - - -
∼¬¬p + - - - - - - - -
¬∼∼p + - + - - + + + +
¬∼¬p + - + + + + + + +
¬¬∼p + - + - - - + + +
¬¬¬p + - + + - + + + +
∼∼∼∼p - + - + + - - + -
∼∼∼¬p - + - - - - - - -
∼∼¬∼p - + + + + + + + +
∼∼¬¬p - + + + + + + + +
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0 1 02 2 12 3 i(0) i(1) i(0, 1)
∼¬∼∼p - + - - - - - - -
∼¬∼¬p - + - - - - - - -
∼¬¬∼p - + - - - - - - -
∼¬¬¬p - + - - - - - - -
¬∼∼∼p - + - + + + + + +
¬∼∼¬p - + - - - - + + +
¬∼¬∼p - + + + + + + + +
¬∼¬¬p - + + + + + + + +
¬¬∼∼p - + - + + - + + +
¬¬∼¬p - + - - - - + + +
¬¬¬∼p - + - + + + + + +
¬¬¬¬p - + - - + - + + +
∼∼∼∼∼p + - + - - - + - -
∼∼∼∼¬p + - + + + + + + +
∼∼∼¬∼p + - - - - - - - -
∼∼∼¬¬p + - - - - - - - -
∼∼¬∼∼p + - + + + + + + +
∼∼¬∼¬p + - + + + + + + +
∼∼¬¬∼p + - + + + + + + +
∼∼¬¬¬p + - + + + + + + +
∼¬∼∼∼p + - - - - - - - -
∼¬∼∼¬p + - - - - - - - -
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0 1 02 2 12 3 i(0) i(1) i(0, 1)
∼¬∼¬∼p + - - - - - - - -
∼¬∼¬¬p + - - - - - - - -
∼¬¬∼∼p + - - - - - - - -
∼¬¬∼¬p + - - - - - - - -
∼¬¬¬∼p + - - - - - - - -
∼¬¬¬¬p + - - - - - - - -
¬∼∼∼∼p + - + - - + + + +
¬∼∼∼¬p + - + + + + + + +
¬∼∼¬∼p + - - - - - + + +
¬∼∼¬¬p + - - - - - + + +
¬∼¬∼∼p + - + + + + + + +
¬∼¬∼¬p + - + + + + + + +
¬∼¬¬∼p + - + + + + + + +
¬∼¬¬¬p + - + + + + + + +
¬¬∼∼∼p + - + - - - + + +
¬¬∼∼¬p + - + + + + + + +
¬¬∼¬∼p + - - - - - + + +
¬¬∼¬¬p + - - - - - + + +
¬¬¬∼∼p + - + - - + + + +
¬¬¬∼¬p + - + + + + + + +
¬¬¬¬∼p + - + - - - + + +
¬¬¬¬¬p - + - - + - + + +
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